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RE-THINKING HUMANITARIAN AID IN THE POST-GULF WAR ERA: THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE RED CROSS TAKES THE LEAD
Sarah R. Denne*
It remains a cardinal humanitarian principle that innocent civilians--and
above all the most vulnerable-should not be held hostage to events
beyond their control. Those already afflicted by war's devastation cannot
continue to pay the price of a bitter peace. It is a peace that will also prove
to be tenuous if unmet needs breed growing desperation.'
INTRODUCTION
The cumulative effect of the more than nine-year sanctions on the
Iraqi people during the 1990s was devastating. Nine years of economic,
financial, and intellectual isolation caused enormous human suffering, espe-
cially among the young, women, and the elderly. The sanctions resulted in
death and disease, broken lives, lost skills, violent crimes, prostitution, di-
vorce, and family desertion, which have undermined the entire social and
moral fabric of Iraqi society. The collapse of educational institutions pro-
duced higher levels of illiteracy and harmed an entire generation of child-
ren.
2
Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq was a "high-middle-income country"
with a large sector of the population inhabiting urban areas.3 Oil production
was a dominant force in the Iraqi economy, accounting for ninty percent of
* B.A., Saint Vincent College (2005); J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of
Law (2008). I would like to thank Professor Amos Guiora for his feedback, honesty, and
invaluable support during the various stages of this note. I would also like to thank Victoria
Marquard and Kevin Carter for their contributions and inspiration.
1 Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, Report to the Secretary-General dated 15
July 1991 on Humanitarian Needs in Iraq, para. 138, U.N. Doc. S/22799 (July 17, 1991),
available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/LJNDOC/GEN/N91/228/18/img/N9122828
.pdf?OpenElement.
2 Evelyne Hong, Globalisation and the Impact on Health: A Third World View, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK 60-64 (2000), available at http://phmovement.org/pdf/pubs/phm-pubs-
hong.pdf.
3 Eric Hoskins, The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq, in
POLrnCAL GAIN AND CIvuiAN PAIN: HuMANrrARIAN IMPACTS OF ECONOMIC SANCrIONS 91
(Thomas G. Weis et al. eds., 1997).
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export earnings and sixty percent of the gross domestic product.4 Because
Iraq was insulated geographically and relied on a single lucrative export, the
country was vulnerable to the effects of economic sanctions that targeted oil
production, among other things. 5 While Iraq was not alone in its plight dur-
ing the period of United Nations sanctions, the case of Iraq exemplifies the
consequences of U.N. sanctions on the civilians of a target country.6
The focus of this Note is not to debate the effectiveness of econom-
ic sanctions, but rather to suggest a workable scheme by which humanita-
rian aid can be administered in the aftermath of comprehensive U.N. sanc-
tion regimes. My solution is to re-work the U.N. humanitarian system by
creating a lead agency in the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). Under this system, the ICRC will have full authority to make deci-
sions regarding the organization of efforts and security in the field. Part I
discusses the background surrounding the U.N. sanctions imposed against
Iraq and the resulting humanitarian consequences. Part II describes the
problems within the U.N. system and the United Nation's inadequate re-
sponse to the crisis. Specifically, I address the controversial Oil-for-Food
Program, the inefficient operations and arbitrary decision-making within the
Iraqi Sanctions Committee, and the problems of mismanagement and lack
of authority of humanitarian agencies in the field. Part III outlines the solu-
tion of creating a lead agency in the ICRC. First, I discuss how the ideology,
structure, international acceptance, and status of the ICRC combine to ad-
dress the precise shortcomings of the current U.N. system. Second, I pro-
pose how the ICRC can adequately address emerging security problems in
the international humanitarian community. Overall, I focus on the benefits
of having the ICRC as a lead agency and how this approach improves on
recent attempts by the U.N. to strengthen the capacity, improve the efficien-
cy, and regain the legitimacy of its humanitarian response.
I. BACKGROUND
A. U.N. Sanctions Imposed on Iraq
The United States responded to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on Au-
gust 2, 1990, by enacting Executive Order 12,722, declaring the situation in
Iraq a national emergency, imposing an immediate embargo on Iraq, and
4 Id.
5 Paul Conlon, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF THE IRAQ
SANCTIONS COMMITrEE, 1990-1994 161 (2000).
6 See generally Johan Galtung, On the Effects ofInternational Economic Sanction, With
Examples from the Case of Rhodesia, 19 WORLD POL. Q.J. OF INT'L PEL. 378 n.3 (1967);
Thomas G. Weiss, Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses, 36
J. PEACE RES. 499, 504 n.5 (1999).
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freezing all Iraqi assets.7 The U.N. Security Council (Security Council) re-
sponded shortly thereafter by initiating economic sanctions against Iraq.8
On August 6, 1990, the Security Council adopted Resolution 661, which
prohibited the export of all commodities and products from Iraq, the sale of
commodities to Iraq (including military equipment), and the transfer of
funds to Iraq.9 Additionally, Resolution 661 set up the Iraqi Sanctions
Committee (ISC) to monitor the implementation of these sanctions)10 Dur-
ing the development of Resolution 661, there was some dissension among
members of the Security Council about the inclusion of foodstuffs among
items prohibited by the sanctions. In this way, Resolution 661 differed from
previous sanctions regimes because the Security Council had never before
listed foodstuffs as a prohibited category. Although Resolution 661 did not
completely ban foodstuffs in all circumstances, a narrow exception allowed
foodstuffs only in "humanitarian circumstances," and this did little to alle-
viate qualms within the Security Council."1
In September 1990, the Security Council discovered that the Iraqi
government was misappropriating donations of food and medical supplies.
Instead of distributing the aid to Iraqi civilians as directed by the United
Nations, the Iraqi government used the aid to support its military. 12 In re-
sponse to the misuse of humanitarian donations and the growing concern
that the Iraqi government was not providing adequate care to its citizens, the
Security Council passed Resolution 666. Resolution 666 addressed the
problem of misappropriation by requiring that "foodstuffs should be pro-
vided through the [United Nations] in co-operation with the International
Committee of the Red Cross or other appropriate humanitarian agencies and
distributed by them or under their supervision in order to ensure that they
7 Christopher C. Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and International Law: Reflections on
the United Nations' Experience Against Iraq, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 19-20 (1991); Exec. Or-
der No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (Aug. 2, 1990).
8 Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, & Mikael Eriksson, UN Sanctions Against Iraq:
Lessons Learned, 5-6 (2005), available at http://www.smartsanctions.se/literature/
iraqreport_05021 0.pdf.
9 See S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
'0 U.N. Sanctions Secretariat, Dept. of Political Affairs, Smart Sanctions, The Next Step:
Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions, 1, 4 (Dec. 3-5, 2000) (paper presented at the Second
Expert Seminar, Berlin), available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/sanctions/
overview.pdf.
11 Paul Conlon, Lessons From Iraq: The Functions of the Iraq Sanctions Committee as a
Source of Sanctions Implementation Authority and Practice, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 633, at 634-
35 (1995).
2 See U.N. SCOR, 4th Sess., 2939th mtg., at 12-13, 19, 25, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2939 (Sept. 13,
1990); See also Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 768 (2006).
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reach the intended beneficiaries." 13 The ISC had discretionary authority to
determine whether "urgent" need existed that required immediate distribu-
tion of foodstuffs to Iraqi civilians. If the need existed, the Committee was
required to "report promptly" in formulating a plan on how to deal with the
urgent humanitarian situation.
14
After the U.S.-led military campaign against Iraq, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 687 to set forth the terms of peace. 15 Resolution
687 had far-reaching effects, including defining U.N. involvement in Iraq
for over a decade following its adoption in 1991. The Resolution set forth
measures intended to bring peace and security to the region, while at the
same time keeping in place many of the enforcement measures from Reso-
lutions 661 and 666-namely sanctions and the authorization to "use all
necessary means" for Iraqi compliance.1 6 Resolution 687 differed slightly
from 661 and 666 in that Resolution 687 allowed an exemption for foods-
tuffs and supplies "deemed essential to civilian needs," whereas 661 and
666 permitted this type of aid only in humanitarian circumstances. Although
Resolution 687 was intended to improve upon previous sanctions by elimi-
nating restrictions on humanitarian aid objected to under 661 and 666, there
is little difference between an exemption where supplies are "essential to
civilian needs" and an exception to a prohibition "except in humanitarian
circumstances." If Resolution 687 added anything to previous sanctions, it
was increased regulation of humanitarian goods. Resolution 687 neither
increased efficiency nor eliminated arbitrary decision-making within the
ISC. 17
13 S.C. Res. 666, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/666 (Sept. 13, 1990); Sacks, 466 F.3d 764, 768;
See also Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and International Law, supra note 7, at 9 (describing
S.C. Res. 666 as the response to "humanitarian concerns" about lack of foodstuffs for Iraqi
civilians and how 666 established guidelines intended to "govern international humanitarian
assistance").
14 Conlon, supra note 11, at 636; S.C. Res. 666, supra note 13, para. 5.
15 See Wallensteen, Staibano & Eriksson, supra note 8, at 6; See generally S.C. Res. 687,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991) (discussing the need for peace and security in Kuwait
and Iraq).
16 S.C. Res. 687, supra note 15; see U.N. Sanctions Secretariat, supra note 10, at 5.
17 See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 15; see also Conlon, supra note 11, at 645-48. The pur-
pose behind 687 was to expedite humanitarian items through an "accelerated no-objection
procedure." This procedure expedited all materials deemed non-controversial, without re-
view by the Sanctions Committee. The only issues that would appear before the ISC would
be those articles and supplies that had some tentative objection. See id. at 647-48. This solu-
tion resulted in criticism by member states attempting to export goods through this proce-
dure, claiming that the process led to arbitrary application. Many members noted that much
decision-making was still done on a case-by-case basis and that often the result was that an
item had been both rejected an approved on different occasions. The ISC addressed these
concerns in 1992, but the result amounted to giving favorable status to certain items that
[Vol. 39:867
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B. The Humanitarian Crisis
Initially, the international community looked favorably on the sanc-
tions imposed on Iraq because the comprehensive sanctions were intended
as a short-term policy strategy to pressure Iraq into withdrawing from Ku-
wait. Even after the U.S. invasion forced Iraq to withdraw, support re-
mained for the sanctions as a policy tool to compel Iraqi compliance with
disarmament and other U.N. resolutions in place at the time. However, a
measure initially intended to apply political pressure to the government of
Iraq caused great suffering to the most vulnerable section of Iraqi society.
Ironically, those hardest hit by the sanctions were children, the elderly, the
sick, and the poor-those with the least power to influence policy or change
in the government.'
8
Sanctions prevented Iraq from obtaining imports of food, agricul-
tural and structural supplies, and medicine necessary to sustain society. In
1990, the sanctions cut off food subsidies and loan guarantees formerly pro-
vided by the United States.' 9 Without the aid of imports from other coun-
tries, Iraq had to procure its own medicine, food, and supplies in order to
maintain the pre-war standard of living and prevent a devastating humanita-
rian crisis.
20
Although the sanctions against Iraq were viewed initially as "inno-
vative and nonviolent tools of international coercion, their actual effect
left the innocent civilian population to withstand the worst of deteriorating
economic circumstances caused by the sanctions. The combination of the
Gulf War and both economic and financial sanctions, including a ban on
were never really blocked in the first place. Thus, the arbitrary application by the ISC of
exports to Iraq persisted. See id at 649.
18 Global Policy Forum, Iraq Sanctions: Humanitarian Implications and Options for the
Future, (Aug. 6, 2002), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraql/
2002/paper.htm.
19 Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, supra note 1, at para. 17. Before the sanc-
tions, Iraq received $5 billion in food subsidies since 1983, $141 million in direct export
subsidies in 1985, and $2.5 million in export loan guarantees since 1988. Id.
20 Id. Prior to sanctions, Iraq was the twelfth largest purchaser of U.S. agricultural prod-
ucts and the single largest importer of U.S. rice. Review Iraqi Agriculture: From Oil for
Food to the Future of Iraqi Production, Agriculture and Trade: Hearing Before the H. Select
Comm. on Agriculture, 108th Cong. 4, 26 (2004) (Statements of Rep. Charles Stenholm and
John King, Vice Chairman, USA Rice Council). Iraq imported approximately $360 million
worth of drugs and medical supplies annually from various countries. Due to the embargo, all
of these imports were restricted. Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, supra note 1,
at para. 17.
21 Christopher Joyner, United Nations After Iraq: Looking Back to See Ahead, 4 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 329, 338 (2003) ([M]easures that initially were intended as a means to apply nonvio-
lent economic pressure on the Iraqi government deteriorated into an aggravated humanitarian
crisis for nearly all of Iraq's society.").
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international oil sales and freezing of Iraqi assets, had a profound effect on
the living conditions in Iraq. Civilians were deprived of necessary medi-
cines and foodstuffs critical to their survival, and water quality and the
availability of utilities decreased significantly.2 2 The damage to water treat-
ment plants during the Gulf War, combined with the inability to obtain
spare parts due to restrictive sanctions, led to a significant decrease in suita-
ble water.23 Raw sewage flowed in the streets of several cities due to a badly
damaged national sewage system.24 The food supply began to deteriorate
quickly and lower than normal harvest yields caused inadequate nutrition.
The situation worsened because sanctions already restricted imports of agri-
cultural products and foodstuffs. The government rationing system in place
was at best able to supply about one-third of a normal family's food supply'
resulting in a shockingly low level of dietary intake.25 With the resulting
health crisis caused by the lack of clean water and severe food shortages
throughout Iraq, the population was also not able to receive adequate medi-
cal care. The main problem was that health programs were desperate for
supplies and spare parts to maintain machinery-which were simply not
available-causing a forced decrease in health care activities available to
the public.26
Several reports by humanitarian agencies published in the 1990s at-
tempted to bring to light the increasingly deteriorating conditions in Iraq.27
22 id.
23 Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, supra note 1, at para. 16. Approximately
2.5 million Iraqis were cut off from a clean water supply, while the 14.5 million Iraqis who
continued to receive suitable water were forced to live on one quarter the amount they re-
ceived before the war. Id.
24 Id. The raw sewage led to an increase of diarrhoeal diseases and outbreaks of typhoid
and cholera. Id.
25 Id. The harvest yielded only a third of the previous year's crop, causing alarmingly
levels of inflation for daily staples such as wheat and rice. Id.
26 Id. at para. 17. Lack of spare parts, deficient maintenance, decreased power generation
and lack of telecommunications led to a deterioration of medical equipment. After the Gulf
War, power generation was barely functioning and five months later the power generation
produced only forty percent of the pre-war levels. Also, a majority of phone lines were either
beyond repair or severely damaged. All international telecommunications were out of service
as of July 1991, a period when health and humanitarian assistance from international actors
was most needed. Id. at paras. 20-21.
27 See generally UNICEF, The Status of Children and Women in Iraq, (1995),
http://leb.netlbcome/iraw/unicef.html; UNICEF, Humanitarian Situation in Iraq: Sub-
Commission Decision 1997/119, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUB.2/EC/1997/l19, (1997); Press
Release, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Warns of Danger to
Near East if Outbreak of Animal Diseases in Iraq is Not Contained-Situation Could Threat-
en Near East Food Security," U.N. Doc. 99/04 (Feb. 10, 1999), available at
http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/OIS/PRESSNE/PRESSENG/1999/pren9904.html (last
visited Sept. 7, 2007); see also Joyner, supra note 21, at 338 (describing the studies).
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The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) released findings that the
infant mortality rate doubled and the mortality rate for children under five
had increased six-fold since the implementation of the sanctions.28 In March
1991, the Under-Secretary-General, and former president of the United Na-
tions, reported on the dangerous situation in Iraq. Ahtisaari stated "most
means of modem life support [had] been destroyed" and described Iraq as
"relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-
industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology.
29
A report to the U.N. Secretary General in July 1991 reported on
specific aspects of the crisis and made recommendations on how to alleviate
it. The report estimated that the total cost to sustain the Iraqi population was
$6.8 billion for one year and $2.63 billion for only four months.30 Even at a
lower level of production, the report recognized that the resources required
could not be obtained through any U.N.-sponsored assistance program.31
Interestingly, the report noted that Iraq could sustain itself if the United Na-
tions eliminated or decreased the sanctions imposed on Iraq, allowed the
unfreezing of Iraqi assets abroad, and allowed Iraq to produce and sell oil at
pre-war output levels.32 Generating this type of revenue could have allowed
Iraq to rebuild and alleviate the already dire humanitarian crisis. Further-
more, the government of Iraq had agreed to meet the demands of the deteri-
orating civilian population and infrastructure. Iraq offered to make docu-
mentation of oil sales and purchases completely transparent and available
for the United Nations to inspect. The report recommended that the United
28 World Health Organization, Health Conditions of the Population in Iraq Since the Gulf
Crisis, § 4 (Mar. 1996), at http://www.who.int/disasters/resource/pubs/000396.html; see also
Joyner, United Nations After Iraq, supra note 21, at 339 (describing findings).
29 Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, Report to the Secretary-
General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-crisis Environ-
ment, para. 8, U.N. Doc. S/22366; see also Global Policy Forum, supra note 18.
30 Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, supra note 1, at para. 29.
31 Id. at para. 30. At the time of the report, the United Nations had only received $210
million for humanitarian assistance in Iraq, and the majority of funds were earmarked for
providing relief to refugees. Id.
32 Id. at para. 31. The report suggested that the Security Council allow the free-flow of
imports such as supplies and machinery parts to make repairs. This is also the first time the
recommendation was made to allow Iraq to produce and subsequently sell its oil to purchase
necessary supplies and foodstuffs, a plan that was the basis of the "Oil-for-Food Program"
discussed below. The report estimated that if Iraq was permitted to produce I million barrels
of oil, Iraq could make a net profit of $5.5 billion. In order to obtain this level of production,
however, oil facilities would need to be restored to their pre-war functional levels. This could
only be achieved by importing a significant number of spare parts currently banned by sanc-
tions. Id. at para. 33.
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Nations supervise and make periodic reports on the situation, but unfortu-
nately, no such plan was adopted at the time.33
II. PROBLEMS IN PROGRAM AND SANCTIONS MANAGEMENT
In the midst of Iraq's large-scale humanitarian crisis, various prob-
lems in U.N. program and sanctions management prevented alleviation of
the deteriorated living conditions. First, the U.N. "Oil-for-Food Program"
was only mildly successful and could not provide a comprehensive solution
to the problem. Second, sanctions management within the ISC was fru-
strated by a lack of standards and lengthy decision-making. Stifled decision-
making within the ISC regarding goods going into Iraq was problematic
because Iraq was in the midst of a considerable humanitarian crisis, caused
by the very sanctions that the ISC struggled to implement. Lastly, conflict
and confusion of authority on the ground in Iraq between U.N. relief agen-
cies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other humanitarian or-
ganizations only added to an already desperate situation.
A. Response to the Humanitarian Crisis: Oil-for-Food
Nearly five years after the humanitarian crises had been docu-
mented and highly publicized, and in response to growing criticisms of the
sanctions regime, the Security Council passed Resolution 986, establishing
the Oil-for-Food Program (Program).34 Although The Program provided
some alleviation, it fell short of totally eradicating the economic implica-
tions of the sanctions. Not only was the Program highly unpopular, but it
also showed that Iraq faced a long and difficult struggle to regain its eco-
nomic independence and sustainability.
The goal of the Program was to buy humanitarian goods and sup-
plies by exporting Iraqi oil to finance the purchase of food, medicine, and
supplies for infrastructure rehabilitation. 35 Additionally, funds from The
Program were used to pay war reparations owed to Kuwait and salaries of
U.N. officials charged with administering Program operations.36 Though
33 Id. at para. 34. Allowing the United Nations to inspect documents of crude oil sales and
purchases made would have been a simple procedure because U.S. banks kept all revenues
from oil sales in Iraq. Id.
34 See S.C. Res. 986, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14, 1995); see generally U.N.
Sanctions Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, A Brief Overview of Security Council
Applied Sanctions 7-8 (2000), available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/sanctions/
overview.pdf (discussing Oil-for-Food arrangements).
35 See U.N. Office of the Iraq Programme, Oil-for-Food: About the Programme (Nov. 3,
2003), http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/fact-sheet.html.
36 See Reem Bahdi, Iraq, Sanctions and Security: A Critique, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 237, 238 (2002); see also U.N. Office of the Iraq Programme, supra note 35 (specify-
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originally intended as a temporary measure to relieve the suffering of the
Iraqi people, the Program continued for thirteen phases until its eventual
termination in November 20, 2003. 37
In order to purchase necessary humanitarian supplies, Iraq was re-
quired to provide a list of goods and supplies that it intended to purchase.
Ultimately, the ISC decided whether to authorize specific requests for pur-
chases made by Iraq from another country. The ISC evaluated all requests
for items on a case-by-case basis. If approved, the ISC released the funds
from an escrow account set up specifically for the Program in New York.
Upon delivery in Iraq, the country exporting the approved goods and sup-
plies was paid out of the escrow account. Once the goods arrived in Iraq, the
United Nations oversaw distribution in northern Iraq and other U.N. agen-
cies distributed the goods in the central and southern parts of the country.38
Unfortunately, the Program seemed to work more in theory than in
practice. The Iraqi government was not satisfied with the functioning of the
Program and criticized it as interfering with Iraqi sovereignty. In a letter to
the Security Council in April 1998, Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister demanded
an immediate lifting of the sanctions, while journalists in Iraq published
articles criticizing the Program and its effects. 39 The objection by Iraq was
not surprising because the United Nations controlled every aspect of the
Program and gave Iraq no control over the purchases made with its oil ex-
port earnings.40 Nearly six years after the Program's implementation, Iraq
had successfully exported about $64 billion in oil. The value of the exported
oil is not nearly as remarkable when compared to the value of goods that
actually reached the hands of Iraqi civilians. For example, out of the $64
billion exported in those first six years, only $28 billion worth of foodstuffs,
ing the percentages of allocation of the funds: 72% for humanitarian supplies, 25% for repa-
rations, 2.2% for administrative costs, and 0.8% for weapons inspection program).
37 U.N. Office of the Iraq Programme, Oil-for-Food: About the Programme, Implementa-
tion of Oil-for-Food: A Chronology, http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/chron.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2007); U.N. Office of the Iraq Programme, Oil-for-Food: About the
Programme, Phases of the Programme, http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/chron.
html (last visited Sept. 13, 2007); See also U.N. Sanctions Secretariat, supra note 10, at 7.
38 See Press Release, Testimony of Robert Werner, Dir., U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to the
Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Af-
fairs (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js2998.htm.
39 Douglas Scott, The Practical Effect of the Iraqi Oil-for-Food Program, 25
DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY (Apr. 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/news/iraq
/1998/04/980400_ds.htm; Barbara Crossette, Iraq Again Threatens to Halt Arms Inspectors,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1998, at A3; Lea Carol Owen, Between Iraq and a Hard Place: The
U.N. Compensation Commission and its Treatment of Gulf War Claims, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 499, 543 (1998).
40 See Scott, supra note 39.
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equipment, and supplies actually arrived to Iraq.41 Included in that estimate
are goods such as spare oil parts and other goods not directly consumed by
civilians.42
Although the Program improved the humanitarian situation in Iraq
somewhat, it did not entirely alleviate the humanitarian crisis.43 By 1997,
the international community began to realize that the Program could only
achieve limited success while sanctions were still in place. 44 Interestingly,
the Program did not provide for a way to supplement the goods coming into
Iraq under the Program with humanitarian donations. It is a wonder no hu-
manitarian donations system was put in place or even contemplated, consi-
dering that the estimated cost to return Iraq to pre-war productivity levels
was almost $7 billion for one year.45 Recall that the Program produced, on
average, $4.7 billion per year over a six-year span.46 This is nearly half the
amount estimated to successfully alleviate the crisis and return Iraq to pre-
war levels of functionality. This clear deficiency is evidence that the Pro-
gram, albeit mildly successful in alleviating some of the most disastrous and
immediate effects caused by the sanctions, inevitably left the Iraqi popula-
tion to suffer long-term inadequate living conditions.
B. Operations and Problems Within the ISC
When the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 661 and thus
imposed mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq, it simultaneously
created the ISC to carry out a number of subsidiary tasks connected with the
41 Joyner, United Nations After Iraq, supra note 21, at 342.
42 Id. Taking into account smuggling of goods into Iraq and Iraq's own limited production,
the Program only produced a per capita income that was at or below the poverty line estab-
lished by the World Bank-one dollar per day. Id.
43 Id. at 343. The U.N. Secretariat reported in November 2000 that the Program "was
never intended to meet all the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population" nor was it meant
to solve longer-term issues such as increasing the standard of living and dealing with an
ongoing shortage and lack of quality in healthcare. The Secretary-General, Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Resolution 1302, U.N. Doc. No.
S/2000/1132, para. 5 (Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/NOO/760/04/PDF/N076004.pdfOpenElement.
44 The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that "the embargo still in
force was seriously jeopardizing the health and nutritional state of the civilian population of
Iraq, especially children, women and the most underprivileged sectors of the population."
U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, "Humanitarian Situation in Iraq," Sub-commission
decision 1997/199, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/554221922
d46153bc 1256991004a440b/7832b764656b6fcf80256681004d4981?OpenDocument (last
visited Nov. 5, 2007).
45 Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General, supra note 1, at para. 29.
46 This figure comes from the $28 billion in usable goods and supplies that came into Iraq
as a result of the Program, and broken down over a period of six years. See Joyner, United
Nations After Iraq, supra note 21, at 342.
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sanctions. The Security Council created the ISC in order to funnel sanctions
activities and decisions into a more streamlined, specialized sub-organ of
the Council.47 The Security Council granted the ISC a significant amount of
authority to make decisions regarding the distribution and administration of
humanitarian affairs under the sanctions, while also giving the ISC power to
grant exemptions from general export bans. With a mixture of general and
specific functions, the ISC was responsible for two logically and organiza-
tionally unrelated tasks, enforcement of a trade control regime and mitiga-
tion of that regime for humanitarian purposes. This "Jekyll and Hyde" situa-
tion persisted throughout the sanctions regime in Iraq and resulted in a fru-
stration of the ISC's success in implementing the sanctions. 48
The two diametrically opposed tasks of the ISC-enforcing a com-
prehensive export ban and alleviating a humanitarian crisis-led to consi-
derable problems within the U.N.-created body. An overwhelming number
of "blocks" and "holds" nearly suffocated the timely administration of the
export ban, while the use of humanitarian waivers was fraught with turmoil
and abuse. Adding to these problems was the ISC's policy of non-
transparency and a general practice of member countries acting out of eco-
nomic self-interest, instead of a collective interest geared toward lessening
the humanitarian situation.
The ISC's approval process for exports going into Iraq was compli-
cated and usually drawn-out due to the convoluted system of "blocks" and
"holds." Upon receiving a request from a country to export a shipment of
goods, each member of the ISC was invited to review and make objections
to the request. In the rare case that no member of the ISC objected, an "au-
thorization letter" was sent to the exporting country, expressly granting ap-
proval for the shipment. More than likely, a member would contest the re-
quest and place on it either a "block" or "hold."49 Interestingly, the differ-
ence between the two was slight: a member used a "hold" when expecting
to approve the item, but wanted more time to deliberate and research, while
a "block" was nearly a total rejection of the proposed request. The ISC dis-
cussed both blocked and held items at subsequent meetings, where contest-
ing members explained their objections to the request. While the remaining
members sometimes attempted to dissuade the objecting member, it was the
usual and unfortunate case for the objecting member to remain uncon-
vinced. Because every request through the ISC required unanimous approv-
al, a single objecting member could prevent approval of a shipment of
goods.5°
47 Conlon, supra note 11, at 633-34.
41 Id. at 638.
49 Conlon, supra note 5, at 32-33.
'0 Id. at 32-33.
2007-2008]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Eventually, the ISC became overwhelmed by the sheer number of
blocks and holds that a single meeting was not sufficient to address all re-
quests that had arisen since the previous meeting. Since the majority of ISC
meetings were devoted to debating blocked items, innumerable requests
were placed on hold indefinitely. The ISC could not keep up on the large
backlog of unapproved items on hold, resulting in countries waiting months,
and even years, for an answer to a request that was more likely than not
rejected in the end. 51 In this way, the ISC was a victim of self-imposed for-
mality and procedure.
The second criticism of the ISC involved the use of "humanitarian
waivers" to fulfill its directive to improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq.
The ISC developed the waivers-set forth in Resolution 666-in order to
increase efficiency within the ISC for approving requests to export humani-
tarian goods to Iraq. In practice however, the use of the waivers resulted in
more abuse than success.
52
The humanitarian waivers created four categories of exceptions: (1)
medicines, (2) foodstuffs, (3) items deemed humanitarian if no delegate
objected, and (4) no-objection items. 3 If a country wished to ship goods in
the medicine category to Iraq, the country was not required to notify the
ISC. Notification was required, however, for the three remaining categories.
Additionally, even though a country wishing to import medicine was not
required to notify the ISC of a shipment, notification became necessary
because clearance from the ISC helped in customs processing and shipping
formalities. Although supposedly distinct, the difference in the characteriza-
tion of a "humanitarian" versus a "no-objection" item was slight, and the
resulting characterization could be fatal. The ISC could reject no-objection
items for any reason, while humanitarian items were looked upon more fa-
vorably.54
Regardless of the designation, an entity wishing to ship goods to
Iraq under the humanitarian waiver procedure was still subject to a some-
what inefficient bureaucratic process. First, with respect to goods deemed
humanitarian and no-objection items, the process in the ISC was not an im-
SI See Conlon, supra note 5, at 33.
52 Id. at 59-60.
53 Id. at 60. Medicines included medical supplies for humans in their "end-user form" like
drugs and bandages, while items like surgical equipment were usually not included. Foods-
tuffs included products for human consumption such as wheat, cereals, and beverages (in-
cluding beer), but did not include cigarettes or liquor. Items deemed humanitarian included
civilian clothes, shoes, and blankets, packaging materials, soap, and books and materials for
education. No objection items included animal vaccines and feed, vials, Petri dishes, and
food preservatives like casein and emulsifying salts. Id. at 60-62.
54 See Conlon, supra note 5, at 61-62 (explaining the process of importing medicine and
other no-objection items).
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provement over what was already in place for blocks and holds. When the
ISC members met to discuss an objection to a good deemed humanitarian or
any other no-objection good, most members were silent while the objecting
member gave reasons for not wanting to approve the particular good. As
before, one objecting member of the ISC could trump the will of the over-
whelming majority.55 Furthermore, the decision-making process was never
refined to make it more practical and efficient. For instance, there were no
distinct criteria to guide decisions once it was determined that a particular
good fell into one of the four categories. Regardless of designation, the end-
use and end-user was determinative of the final decision. For example, the
ISC denied a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) shipment of health
kits because a member of the ISC objected that scissors could possibly be
used as weapons.56 The ISC approved similar items in one instance and re-
jected in another based on how the exporting country initially described the
request. Needless to say, the ISC developed a reputation for making arbi-
trary decisions. 57 Paul Conlon, former deputy secretary of the ISC, de-
scribed the process of issuing humanitarian waivers as "fraught with intel-
lectual dishonesty ... and inconsistency in positions thinly tempered with
pedantic legalistic arguments. 58 Conlon took issue with member states
making decisions based on their individual stake in the outcome.59 Overall,
Conlon believed that the ISC "failed to prevent the abuse of humanitarian
waivers, it failed to help the civilian population... it failed to create any
doctrine or to systematize its practice, and thus it failed to create any posi-
tive legacy for future development of humanitarian mitigation norms in
sanctions regimes., 60
C. Problems in the Field.: Ineffective U.N. Coordination
While the ISC struggled to implement sanctions and improve the
humanitarian situation from Geneva, the situation was exacerbated by a lack
5' Id. at 64.
56 Id. at 21.
57 See id. at 70. Indeed, sometimes the decisions about certain goods were blatantly wrong.
For instance, in 1990, the ISC refused to approve a donation to Iraq from United Nations
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)--a legitimate humanitarian agency. Id. at 77. Interes-
tingly enough, as of 1994, the United States had been cleared for $13,490,209 worth of ex-
ported goods into Iraq-an acceptance rate of 100%. However, countries like Romania
(2.28% acceptance rate) and the Philippines (0% acceptance rate) had a much harder time
getting items approved by the ISC. Id. at 68-69.
58 Conlon, supra note 5, at 80.
59 Id. Information from a 1994 report on waiver clearances does much to support this fact.
Permanent members of the U.N. Security Council maintained a 92.81% acceptance rate,
while non-member states retained a 37.61% acceptance rate. Id. at 68-69.
60 Id. at 80.
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of coordination and general sense of confusion on the ground in Iraq.
Amongst the numerous U.N. organizations, NGOs, and other relief agencies
working in the field, no one agency or entity was granted ultimate decision-
making authority. Relief agencies were left to their own devices to deal with
inter-agency politics and concerns of the local government. The lack of
coordination and authority structure did little to streamline relief efforts that
were desperately needed to help the Iraqi population recover from the dete-
riorated living conditions during the period of U.N. sanctions.
Among the myriad of varied organizations involved in providing
aid on the ground, conflicting mandates and operating procedures stifled the
provision of aid and led to frequent clashes of authority. Among the U.N.
agencies involved on the ground were UNICEF, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations World Food
Program (WFP), and the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization
(UNDRO), to name a few. To add to the confusion, national and interna-
tional NGOs along with private relief organizations increased the size of the
relief effort.6' The sheer volume of aid workers involved in the large-scale
relief operation made it difficult to divide labor into a workable scheme.
The size of the relief effort and lack of identifiable authority contri-
buted to a general frustration of the decision-making process. In the unlikely
event that agencies were able to come to a consensus on an issue, imple-
mentation was difficult and often protracted. Decision-making was invaria-
bly slow because important decisions, especially in the case of U.N. agen-
cies, had to be approved by each agency's headquarters prior to implemen-
62tation. To compound this issue, the staff members in the field were not
certain which entity had authority to implement changes to existing opera-
tions. For example, several U.N. agencies (UNDRO, WFP, and UNHCR)
collectively decided to increase the sugar ration. Though the increase was
slight-from ten grams to fifteen grams per day-approval was required.
UNDRO first made the request at its headquarters in Geneva. From there,
UNDRO officials passed the request to the WFP in Rome, which deferred to
the UNHCR back in Geneva. The request was denied after nearly a month.63
Throughout the crisis, the many U.N. agencies, NGOs, and private
relief organizations failed to establish a functional scheme of hierarchy that
could apply to all agencies working in the field. The United Nations made
several attempts to coordinate its own agencies in the field, but these at-
tempts failed because the plans were obscure and only added to the confu-
61 See generally Larry Minear et al., United Nations Coordination of the International
Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis 1990-1992 (Occasional Paper 13), at 8 (Thomas
J. Watson, Jr. Institute for Int'l Studies 1992) (explaining the lack of coordination and gener-
al sense of confusion on the ground in Iraq).
62 See id. at 9-10.
63 Id. at 8-9.
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sion. Instead of correcting the flawed system already in place, the United
Nations simply planted authority figures from Geneva into the region, poor-
ly equipping them with a meaningless title and no substantive knowledge of
the conflict operations.
The best example of this is the development of an "Action Plan" by
the United Nations The Action Plan supposedly created a "lead agency" in
the UNHCR, but this lasted only a short time before roles became confused.
For instance, the United Nations sent Resident Coordinators (the designated
representatives for the Secretary General in a given country) to Iraq, who
were theoretically in charge of the UNHCR. At the same time, the United
Nations also sent Senior U.N. Emergency Members (SUNEMs) to Iraq, to
serve directly under Resident Coordinators. But since both Resident Coor-
dinators and SUNEMs were responsible for coordination, their respective
roles were never clarified. The UNHCR had to determine which, if any,
decisions it had authorization to make or whether it should defer to a Resi-
dent Coordinator or a SUNEM. For individuals working in the field and
Iraqi government officials, this problem was exacerbated. 64 Soon after it
became apparent that the United Nations could not create an effective orga-
nizational system in the field, agencies began to vie for a limited number of
contracts with the local government. This created competitive and adver-
sarial relationships between agencies that should have been working togeth-
er towards a common goal. The Iraqi government faced similar confusion,
as it dealt with each agency separately and on varying terms.
65
III. SOLUTION: CREATING A LEAD AGENCY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
The United Nations failed to adequately deal with the humanitarian
situation caused by the imposition of comprehensive sanctions against Iraq.
Inadequacy of the Oil-for-Food Program, issues within the Iraqi Sanctions
Committee, and mismanagement on the field demonstrate the need to
reform U.N. sanctions and crisis management. Arguably, all aspects of U.N.
operations and procedure in Iraq should be modified to deal with future
crises. This Note, however, deals with the latter problem of the U.N. re-
sponse: mismanagement of humanitarian field operations of agencies on the
ground. I argue that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
should be designated as the lead agency in all future humanitarian crises
64 See id. at 8-12.
65 See id. at 19-20. Because the agencies could not effectively coordinate their efforts,
negotiation with the local government authorities became a free-for-all. For example, in 1991
before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the SUNEM negotiated with Syria to build a camp for refu-
gees that were expected to flee from Iraq to Syria once the U.S.-led attack began. Although
the government agreed, it was soon bombarded with agencies competing to provide relief for
refugees at the camp. Id. at 18.
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where the United Nations is intimately involved in both sanctions regulation
and management of the humanitarian needs of a target state. Strengthening
the already prominent role of the ICRC will increase efficiency and coordi-
nation in providing humanitarian aid to distressed populations and should
adequately address the emerging security risks that aid workers encounter in
the field.
A. ICRC as the U.N.-designated Lead Agency
In 2005, in response to concerns about the quality and effectiveness
of the U.N. humanitarian response, the United Nations set out to develop
more predictable, efficient, and effective humanitarian operations, and to
build the capacity and technical expertise necessary to fill gaps in critical
sectors and common services.66 The United Nations decided to implement
"clusters" which assigned the responsibilities for key sectors of a relief op-
eration to different U.N. agencies. 67 In each sector within a country, the
United Nations established a Humanitarian Country Team and a Humanita-
rian Coordinator (HC), where cluster lead agencies must report to Country
Teams and HCs, as well as to their respective agency heads. HCs were re-
sponsible for maintaining links with government, local authorities, and state
institutions.68 As of 2005, the United Nations has implemented the cluster
approach in Liberia, Uganda, Pakistan, Lebanon, and the Congo, and
pledged to use the approach in all "new major disasters. 69
Although the United Nations has only recently employed the cluster
approach, authorities in the international community are already questioning
66 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Strengthening of the Coordination of Emergency Hu-
manitarian Assistance of the United Nations, para. 3, U.N. Doc. E/2005/L. 19 (July 13, 2005)
(draft resolution submitted by Vice-President of the Council, Johan Verbeke); see also Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Cluster 2006-Appeal for Improving Humani-
tarian Response Capacity (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://ochaonline.un.org/cap/web
page.asp?Page= 1355 [hereinafter OCHA].
67 Id.; see also Inter-Agency Standing Comm. Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Ap-
proach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response (Nov. 24, 2006), http://www.humanitarian
info.org/iasc/content/news/newsdetails.asp?newsid=53&publish=0 [hereinafter IASC]. At
the country level, clusters "aim to strengthen humanitarian response by demanding high
standards of predictability, accountability and partnership in all sectors or areas of activity...
. [The cluster approach] should significantly improve the quality of international responses to
major new emergencies." Id. at 2.
68 See IASC, supra note 67, at 3-5, 8-9; see also OCHA, supra note 66.
69 See OCHA, supra note 66; see also Mercy Corps, Commentary,Commentary on the
Implementation and Effectiveness of the Cluster Approach (Sept. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900SID/LTIO-6URRB5/$FLE/Mercy/ 20Corps-
clusters-sep2006.pdfOpenElement.
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its effectiveness.7" The system has been criticized as U.N.-dominated, where
only U.N. agencies are appointed as cluster heads and NGO's, private relief
agencies, national governments, civil society groups, and affected popula-
tions have no input in the process. Agencies prevented from having any role
in the key decision-making process are less likely to cooperate with cluster
heads that prefer to keep the agencies insulated and uninformed. Other
complaints include the insufficient quality, skill, and experience of cluster
head lead personnel, as well as an inflexible and unpredictable process with-
in clusters. Another issue is that potential conflicts of interest often exist
within a cluster lead agency. The competitive and resource-starved envi-
ronments cause cluster heads to betray their role as impartial and indepen-
dent. Within an agency, conflicts exist between the interest of the organiza-
tion as a whole and the organization's role as a cluster head that truly jeo-
pardize impartiality in decision-making and threatens legitimacy of the op-
eration.7'
Indeed, while the ICRC supports the United Nations in strengthen-
ing humanitarian response capabilities, it has refused to become part of the
cluster system. Becoming a cluster lead or cluster member would force the
ICRC to be formally accountable to a subsidiary body of the United Na-
tions-the HC appointed to the given area. This accountability would se-
verely threaten the ICRC's independence, impartiality, and neutrality.72 The
ICRC would restrict its dealings with various parties to a conflict, and it
would be forced to follow orders from an entity that has significantly less
knowledge and experience in providing humanitarian aid. The ICRC main-
tains, however, that where clusters are put in place, coordination will still be
a priority.73
Although the ICRC rejects the idea of being a cluster lead, the
ICRC does not dismiss the idea of being a lead agency over all humanitarian
70 See Action Aid Int'l, The Evolving U.N. Cluster Approach in the Aftermath of the Pa-
kistan Earthquake: An NGO Perspective, 3-5 (2006), available at
www.actionaid.org/pakistan/images/ActionAid%20Report%20on%20UN% 2 0Cluster/ 2OAp
proach%20April%202006.pdf, see also Int'l Council of Voluntary Agencies, Report by ICVA
on the Roll-Out of the Cluster Approach in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(DRC)
(Mar. 18 2006), http://www.icva.ch/doc00001846.html [hereinafter ICVA]; see generally
Mercy Corps, supra note 69, at I (discussing the effectiveness and general challenges of the
cluster approach).
71 See Mercy Corps, supra note 69, at 2-6.
72 See e-mail from Simon Schorno, Spokesman/Head of Commc'n, Int'l Comm. of the
Red Cross, to Sarah R. Denne, Assoc. Editor, CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. (Mar. 9, 2007, 14:26
EST) (on file with author).
73 See id. Where clusters are used, the leader of the ICRC delegation in a conflict area
maintains contact with the HC, while the ICRC coordinators work with the relevant cluster
leads. The ICRC has used this approach in Pakistan since October 2005 and maintains that it
will use this approach in all cases where clusters are utilized. Id.
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operations in the U.N. system. 74 As the ultimate lead agency with authority
to make binding decisions in all sectors of a relief operation, the ICRC ef-
fectively eliminates the need for HCs and other U.N.-appointed authority.
The ICRC need not be formally accountable to the United Nations under
this proposed system because the ICRC has its own system of accountability
built into its structure and ideology; the United Nations can trust the ICRC
to make competent and knowledgeable decisions.75
Using the ICRC as the U.N.-designated lead agency responsible for
implementation and oversight of the humanitarian operations on the ground
would remedy the problems evident during the period of sanctions against
Iraq, such as lack of an authority hierarchy, as well as cure deficiencies ap-
parent in the cluster approach like lack of impartiality, independence, and
U.N. domination. With an identifiable organization like the ICRC having
ultimate decision-making authority, full-scale humanitarian relief opera-
tions, agencies, and relief workers would operate within a functional man-
agement structure. Greater clarity in authority and the overall organizational
structure would increase efficiency and ultimately increase the effectiveness
of providing humanitarian goods to a vulnerable population.
1. About the ICRC: Ideology and Structure
"The ICRC is an impartial, neutral and independent organization
whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity
of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assis-
tance. ' 76 The ICRC's distinctive ideology and structure make it especially
capable to lead a large-scale humanitarian relief scheme. First, the ICRC's
ideology involves principles entirely devoted to preserving impartiality and
neutrality-principles that the U.N. cluster system lacks. Second, the
ICRC's structure is intertwined with its ideology, producing a capable and
solid management scheme that would enable the ICRC to adapt to the bu-
reaucratic changes that the system presents.
The ICRC's unique mandate charges the ICRC with the task of pro-
viding relief regardless of when or where a humanitarian crisis occurs. The
mandate, grounded in international law, charges the ICRC with organizing
the relief effort during armed conflicts and in situations of internal vi-
74 See id.
75 I would argue that the only necessary "duties" of the ICRC to the United Nations would
be: (1) to report decisions, (2) give periodic field updates, and (3) notify the U.N. of concerns
or problems in the field. For example, if the ICRC reports a problem of non-compliance by a
U.N. agency, the U.N. would be better able to force compliance by using various methods of
diplomatic punishment, such as cutting of funding.
76 The ICRC's Mission Statement (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/
Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/68EE39?OpenDocument.
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olence. 7 The significance of having a legal mandate is that the ICRC is
obligated to be present when there is a humanitarian crisis unlike most
NGOs or other aid agencies, whose presence during a crisis is completely
voluntary.78
The ICRC's fundamental principles ensure that the agency will be
regarded as impartial and neutral in any given relief operation, thus correct-
ing the problem of the cluster approach. The ICRC is guided by seven "fun-
damental principles"-humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence,
voluntary service, unity, and universality.79 Impartiality means that the
ICRC will not discriminate "as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or
political opinions." 80 In providing aid according to these principles, the
ICRC will distribute its services based on need and "give priority to the
most urgent cases of distress." 81 The idea of neutrality, as embodied by the
ICRC, has special meaning for carrying out aid operations in the field. As a
neutral body, and in order to "enjoy the confidence of all," the ICRC refuses
to take sides in hostilities regardless of the political, racial, religious, or
ideological nature of the conflict. Neutrality and independence also facili-
tate the ICRC's ability to access persons in need. The implications are most
notable in situations of armed conflict where the ICRC must treat bellige-
rents in the same manner as all other parties involved. In theory and prac-
tice, those who require the most relief will receive it, regardless of which
party to a conflict they are. This attitude of equal treatment is necessary to
maintain legitimacy and trust among all parties.
Another facet of the ICRC's ideology is its commitment to coope-
rating with other relief agencies. Because there is no other formal mechan-
ism for humanitarian coordination besides the recently developed clusters,
the ICRC acquaints itself with other organizations, forges links, and ex-
changes information. The ICRC's policy of cooperating with other agencies
in a conflict area will remedy the problem of non-integration evident in the
U.N.-centric cluster approach. Communication and cooperation with other
77 See The ICRC's Mandate and Mission, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/
htmlal/section-mandate?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
78 See The Feinstein Int'l Famine Center, The Future of Humanitarian Action: Implica-
tions of Iraq and Other Recent Crises, 2 (2003), available at http://hwproject.tufts.edu/
pdf/iraq_issues 20031022.pdf.
79 Int'l Comm. Of the Red Cross, Statutes of the International Committee of the Red
Cross, 324 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 537-43 (Sept. 30, 1998), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jpgj?opendocument.
80 Denise Plattner, ICRC Neutrality and Neutrality in Humanitarian Assistance, 311 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS 161, 168 (Apr. 30, 1996), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/
siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/57jn2z?opendocument.
81 Id.
82 See id. at 166.
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agencies should not be construed as being counter to the principle of inde-
pendence. Independence relates to parties to a conflict, the ICRC's com-
mitment to cooperation reflects the ICRC's aim, on one hand, to meet all the
needs of affected populations by avoiding duplication and/or gaps in servic-
es, and on the other hand, to maximize the impact of the overall response.83
The ICRC goes to great lengths to determine the needs of those suffering;
the ICRC recognizes that sharing information between all agencies involved
is the only way to provide an adequate response. The ICRC conducts inde-
pendent assessments while also taking into account the assessments made
by other organizations. While the information concerning the planning of
ICRC activities is systematically shared with other relevant humanitarian
organizations, the ICRC seeks to be informed of other organizations' plan-
ning and considers such information. The goal of these efforts is to ensure
that the needs of a population are covered comprehensively and that the
roles played by the different organizations complement one another. The
only information that the ICRC is unwilling to share with other agencies is
information that may pose security risks to individuals. 84 In this way, the
ICRC is well suited to have full decision-making authority in a field of op-
erations.
Because the ICRC already has an intimate working relationship
with relief agencies regularly involved in providing aid, the ICRC has the
requisite knowledge of agencies in the field and of the underpinnings of a
successful relief operation to make quick and competent decisions about
how aid should be distributed in a given operation. With the ICRC as a lead
agency, entities working under the ICRC will feel confident that the ICRC
is taking into account its objectives and perspectives when making deci-
sions, and as a result, a sense of trust will exist between all agencies in-
volved. The ICRC can rest assured that its principles and authority will not
be undermined by agencies in the field because agencies implementing de-
cisions will have added valuable input in making those decisions. In prac-
tice, the ICRC regularly makes determinations on how tasks should be dis-
tributed based on the skills and capacities of each organization. Operational
decisions are made with full knowledge of other organizations' benefits,
while relying on them to keep in mind those of the ICRC. The ICRC main-
tains regular dialogue with other organizations active in the field to monitor
the progress achieved and obstacles encountered. In particular, the ICRC
focuses on fulfillment of the declared objectives of the various humanitarian
83 See e-mail from Simon Schorno, supra note 72.
84 See id. For example, information linked to detention activities is considered confidential
and is shared only with the relevant authorities. However, issues regarding the protection of
the civilian population are frequently shared with the mandated protection organizations
(OHCHR, UNHCR, UNICEF). Id
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organizations, developments of the situation, and outstanding humanitarian
needs.
Much like its ideology, the ICRC's structure is conducive to a role
that gives it complete authority to make efficient and calculated decisions in
humanitarian emergencies. This relative ease in decision-making is espe-
cially important when a crisis is at hand. The ICRC is comprised of a deli-
berative, cohesive, legislative body that is accustomed to making decisions
that affect civilians in a humanitarian crisis. The ICRC also has, at present,
an enormous presence in the field, with staff working around the world in
conflict areas to further ICRC principles. With sound structures in place, the
ICRC can easily transition from having control over its own affairs, to hav-
ing authority to direct all entities involved in a humanitarian crisis.
The structure of the ICRC is as unique as its mandate. The ICRC is
hybrid in nature, possessing qualities of a private association and an inter-
governmental organization. The ICRC can most accurately be described as
an intergovernmental organization that operates based on an international
mandate. 85 In most ways, the ICRC functions like many other organizations,
with legislative bodies and a president.8 6 The Assembly is the main legisla-
tive body, and is responsible for developing strategy, approving the budget,
and formulating policy. Some of the Assembly's responsibilities, including
making decisions on matters of general policy, funding, personnel, and
communication, are delegated to the Assembly Council. The Assembly
Council reports to the Directorate-the executive body of the ICRC respon-
sible for the implementation of strategy and policy and the overall efficien-
cy of the Committee. 87 The President of the ICRC is responsible for diplo-
matic and external relations. 88 Both the Vice President and President partic-
ipate in the Assembly as well. 89 One difference that sets the ICRC apart
from other organizations is the fact that membership in these bodies is statu-
torily limited to fifteen to twenty-five members, all of whom must be Swiss
citizens. 90 Interestingly, the ICRC has enjoyed much success and is able to
maintain independence and neutrality due to its composition of only Swiss
85 Gabor Rona, The ICRC's Status: In a Class of its Own (Feb. 17, 2004), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5W9FJY. Because of its classifications, the
ICRC enjoys privileges that include "exemption from taxes and customs duties, inviolability
of premises and documents, and immunity from judicial process." Id.
86 See Statutes of the ICRC, Art. 8 (May 5, 2003), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0
.nsf/html/icrc-statutes-080503 (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
87 See ICRC Decision-Making Structures, (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/
siteeng0.nsf/html/icrc-decision-making-structures-030706 (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
88 ICRC Presidency, (Jan. 1, 2006), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/icrc-
presidency-article-0 10106 (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
89 ICRC Decision-Making Structures, supra note 87.
90 Statutes of the ICRC, supra note 86, at Art. 7.
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citizens. For example, the Committee has never failed to agree on any sub-
ject that has come before it for consideration. 91
There is no need to alter the ICRC structure because the system as it
exists produces informed and independent decisions and coordinates with
other international agencies at both the national and global (headquarters)
level. First, at the country level, the ICRC has a strong and capable work-
force implementing the ICRC's mandate worldwide. Currently, the ICRC is
present in more than eighty countries worldwide. 92 Its 800 headquarters
staff, 1,500 expatriates in the field, and 11,000 national staff are helping
millions of persons affected by violence and other disasters. Id. The already
strong presence of the ICRC in the field demonstrates the ICRC's structural
capabilities required to undertake the task of being lead agency. In this way,
the ICRC's staff will not be over-extended. If there is a need to increase the
number of staff in the field, the newcomers will be easily integrated into a
system that is functional and efficient.
Second, at the global headquarters level, ease in decision-making
may be attributed to the fact that the ICRC is completely independent of any
particular political party or country, and is not responsible to any identifia-
ble constituency. The fact that no external agency or country (including
Switzerland) influences the ICRC's decision-making process enables it to
convincingly send the message of independence, one of its most valued
principles.93 Additionally, while the organization's independence fosters
competent decisions at the headquarters level, the ICRC's exclusive struc-
ture does not leave it cut off from other agencies at the ICRC's highest le-
vels of authority. In fact, the ICRC has always considered input from other
agencies when making its decisions regarding institutional and operational
humanitarian coordination.94 Therefore, the ICRC need not alter its ap-
proach when appointed as lead agency. Many international agencies will
already be used to working within the structure of the ICRC and providing
input to work towards the common goal of improving the fate of persons
affected by situations of violence and distress.
91 See Francois Bugnion, The Composition of the International Committee of the Red
Cross, INT'L REV. RED CRoss 427-446 (Aug. 31, 1995), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf.htmlall/57jmmc?opendocument. The fact that the
Committee is composed of Swiss citizens is significant. Switzerland is internationally re-
garded as "neutral," based on its tradition and the special status granted to it by certain trea-
ties. Furthermore, the Swiss have not been involved in any wars for over two centuries. Id.
92 See e-mail from Simon Schorno, supra note 72.
9' See id. Altering the ICRC's structure to include members of other nations, to create
more of an international body, would destroy the idea of the ICRC's independence and
would inevitably lead to outside political pressures from those affected by its decisions.
Committee members would be under tremendous pressure to report the ICRC's activities to
their respective governments, thus frustrating the decision-making process.
94 See id.
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2. International Acceptance and Status
The universal acceptance of the ICRC's legitimacy and expertise,
coupled with the already prominent status of the ICRC, will allow for a
smooth transition to its proposed elevated status in humanitarian crises. The
ICRC's mandate, privileges, immunities, and observer status within the
United Nations have been recognized by the international community and
create a solid base of recognized authority and respect within the field.
That the ICRC already has a firm legal basis in international law
makes granting it total control over humanitarian aid efforts within the U.N.
system even more persuasive. The ICRC's mandate is grounded in two
sources of international law: the Geneva Conventions and the ICRC Sta-
tutes. The Geneva Conventions charge the ICRC with organizing relief ef-
forts in situations of conflict, while the ICRC Statutes provide for similar
tasks in situations of internal violence and disaster.95 The ICRC's principles
and rights are legally-recognized in numerous countries by treaty or other
legislation. Additionally, domestic and international judicial decisions have
recognized the ICRC's judicial immunity and testimonial privileges in order
to preserve the mandate and principles of the ICRC.96 Because the ICRC is
already so highly regarded around the globe, countries are accustomed to
working with the ICRC and recognize the special mandate of the organiza-
tion, thus allowing ease of administration and implementation.
Most important is that the ICRC has achieved special status at the
United Nations as an "observer." 97Observer status, granted in October 1990,
gives the ICRC privileges that no other NGO or international agency has in
the United Nations. As an observer, the ICRC has unfettered access to every
meeting of a U.N. body or council. Previously, the ICRC only had "consul-
tative status," which allowed access by invitation to the U.N. Economic and
Social Council only.98 Observer status gives the ICRC the opportunity to
voice its opinion on relevant matters in meetings of the General Assembly
and other committees, and grants access to U.N. documents that may other-
wise be confidential. 99 The United Nations granted this status to the ICRC
95 The ICRC's Mandate and Mission, supra note 77.
96 Gabor Rona, The ICRC Privilege Not to Testify: Confidentiality in Action, 845 INT'L
REV. RED CROSS (2002), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5WS
D9Q. Courts recognizing ICRC privileges include the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court. Id
97 See The 1CRC is Granted Observer Status at the United Nations, 279 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 581 (1990), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNWH.
98 Christian Koenig, Observer Status for the ICRC at the United Nations: A Legal View-
point, 280 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 37-48 (Feb. 28, 1991), available at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlalIU57jnwj?opendocument.
99 The ICRC is Granted Observer Status at the United Nations, 279 INT'L REV. RED CROSS
581-86 (Dec. 31, 1990), available at http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/
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because it recognized the ICRC's prominent and unique place in providing
humanitarian assistance. The ICRC's views and policy serve as the model
for other agencies, yet no other agency has been able to achieve the same
status within the international community. Observer status demonstrates that
the United Nations holds the ICRC in higher regard than other agencies-
the United Nations desires that those playing a leading role on the interna-
tional scene shape their policy to comport with the views and recommenda-
tions of the ICRC.100
The observer status should serve as the model for U.N.-ICRC rela-
tions when the ICRC is appointed as lead agency of all U.N. humanitarian
missions. The role is especially suited for allowing the ICRC to maintain its
independence, and in many cases, confidential information. The ICRC has
emphatically rejected that this special relationship calls into question its
core principles of neutrality and confidentiality.'O First, the ICRC's status
merely allows it to have a greater say in U.N. policy objectives and strate-
gies in a given situation. Any stance taken by the ICRC will reflect its
mandate to uphold and propagate international humanitarian law-the or-
ganization's only constituent. Moreover, the ICRC's Statutes prevent it
from divulging information shared between the ICRC and a state where it
carries out a humanitarian mission.'0 2 This one-sided relationship with the
United Nations is ideal for the ICRC's role as lead agency in U.N. humani-
tarian affairs.
Because the United Nations needs to reassert its legitimacy in the
humanitarian arena, appointing the ICRC as lead agency will further that
purpose. Nevertheless, the ICRC can only maintain its long-standing legiti-
macy if it remains independent and free from U.N. control. Although the
United Nations will be required to forgo control over the ICRC and access
to its confidential documents, the United Nations will re-affirm its effec-
tiveness and legitimacy in humanitarian affairs. With this relationship, the
United Nations will be able to trust the ICRC in making competent deci-
sions, for the ICRC has accomplished what the United Nations has been
unable to do: achieve universal respect and acceptance of its motives and
policy.
57jnwh?opendocument.
100 See id.
101 Koenig, supra note 98. "[O]bserver status will in no way affect the ICRC's strict policy
of neutrality and discretion." Id.
102 "[C]onfidenti[a]l information concerning non-international armed conflicts or internal
disturbances will never be divulged to third parties in or connected with the United Nations;
such information is shared only with the State that has allowed the ICRC to carry out its
humanitarian mission on its territory." Id.
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B. Security Risks and the ICRC's Seven Pillars
Agencies devoted to providing humanitarian aid are facing prob-
lems that go far beyond mere coordination and organization. Today, agen-
cies are confronted with increased security concerns and major policy quan-
daries.10 3 There are a host of issues arising from the need to interact with
forces whose intervention is seen as illegitimate by significant segments of
public opinion. Additionally, the nature of combat has changed so dramati-
cally that it is often difficult to distinguish between armed forces and gangs
of armed bandits. 1°4 This has lead to a significant increase in the number of
targeted attacks on humanitarian aid workers. Recently, U.N. relief person-
nel in Darfur and Afghanistan have been attacked, while other relief agen-
cies have suffered targeted attacks against their workers in areas like the
Congo and Somalia.0 5 Unfortunately, humanitarian agencies, both of the
United Nations and non-U.N. variety, have been slow to respond to this
insecurity and in many cases, have become increasingly risk-averse. Risk-
aversion is extremely problematic for humanitarian agencies because it of-
ten contradicts the agency's mandate to provide relief in conflict areas. 106
The ICRC, however, has recognized increasing security risks and
has taken affirmative action in developing its "Seven Pillars of Security" to
conquer these ever-present challenges in the field. Creating a lead agency in
the ICRC would do much to encourage other agencies working under the
ICRC to alter or develop security policies analogous to those embraced by
the ICRC.
The ICRC's Seven Pillars are based on the ICRC's fundamental
principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence. The Pillars are: (1)
acceptance, (2) identification, (3) information, (4) security regulations
drawn up by individual delegates, (5) personality, (6) telecommunications,
and (7) passive and active protective measures.10 7 Other humanitarian agen-
103 The Feinstein Int'l Famine Center, supra note 78, at 1.
104 See Phillipe Dind, Security in ICRC Field Operations, SECURE 02, June 2002, at 21, 22.
105 See Alfred de Montesquiou, Aid Groups Warn of Wider Darfur Crisis, CBS NEWS, Jan.
17, 2007, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/01/17/ap/world/mainD8MN9
RIG5.shtml; see also Michael Vincent, U.N. Aid Workers Attacked in Afghanistan, ABC
NEWS, June 15, 2004, http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2004/s1131938.htm; see also DR
Congo Aid Workers Under Attack, BBC NEWS, Jan. 20,2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4192499.stm; see also Missionary Int'l Serv. News Agency,
Attack Against Spanish Aid Workers in Somalia, SPERO NEWS, Feb. 16, 2007,
http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?id=8026&t=-Attack+against+Spanish+aid+work
ers+in+Somalia.
106 Claude Brunderlein & Pierre Gassamann, Managing Security Risks in Hazardous Mis-
sions: The Challenges of Securing United Nations Access to Vulnerable Groups, 19 HARV.
HUM. RTs. J. 63, 64 (2006).
107 Dind, supra note 104, at 26-27, 30-35; See also E-mail from Simon Schorno, supra
note 72.
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cies incorporate the majority of the Pillars into their security policies in
some form, although a few of the Pillars are exclusive to the ICRC. 10 8 The
fact that other agencies may have similar versions of the Pillars in their own
security policies shows that the Pillars have a sort of universal appeal and
general workability. Agencies need not completely re-vamp their security
policies, nor will they have to adopt a system that is foreign in order to fol-
low the lead of the ICRC.
Several of the Seven Pillars are worth discussing to show how they
counter security problems, like risk-aversion. In fact, the ICRC's general
approach to security nearly entirely rejects a risk-averse approach to helping
affected populations. 109 The Pillar of acceptance is achieved two ways: first,
by communication and negotiation with all parties in power (including war-
lords and members of organized crime); and second, by educating ICRC
employees of the local customs and traditions so that they are accepted
within a given area. In this way, the ICRC can only achieve true acceptance
by dealing with all parties in power, regardless of their political or ideologi-
cal beliefs. Although dangerous, the ICRC gains legitimacy and therefore
increased security by assuring ICRC acceptance of all.11° Similarly, in ac-
cordance with the Pillar of identification, the ICRC notifies all parties in-
volved of the buildings and other locations where the ICRC is carrying out
activities in a given area.111
Conversely, if agencies are reluctant to update their security poli-
cies in accordance with ICRC principles, the ICRC as lead agency will have
complete authority either to conduct an operation according to its security
scheme, or to allow for some variance in security policies. Within the cur-
rent ICRC policy, a system of discipline is in place for members of the
ICRC who breach the security regulations drawn up by delegates in charge
of operations within a specific country. A breach of a regulation by an
ICRC field staff member may result in penalties, among them being perma-
nent dismissal from the ICRC. 1 2 This system of punishment can be easily
extended where the ICRC is granted complete control over operations. A
108 Dind, supra note 104, at 26.
'o9 See id. at 22, 35. The ICRC's general policy towards security involves two tenets: (1)
For ICRC field staff, danger is not the exception, it is part of their daily work environment;
and (2) Security is largely a political issue that can be achieved by establishing a network of
contacts among all parties involved so as to convince them of the ICRC's neutrality, impar-
tiality, and independence. Additionally, the Pillar of passive and active protective measures
provides for risk-averse behavior only in "exceptional circumstances." These circumstances
include where the ICRC emblem offers no protection and when staff is just as vulnerable as
other foreigners in an area. In these limited circumstances, the ICRC may use physical bar-
riers, alarm systems, and in the most extreme cases armed guards. Id. at 22, 35.
..o See id. at 27.
... Id. at 30.
112 Id. at 32.
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blatant breach by an agency of a policy deemed essential by the ICRC could
result in dismissal from the operation. The threat and ultimate embarrass-
ment of dismissal by the ICRC will deter agencies from breaching the es-
sential security policies established by the ICRC in a given operation.
In a particular field of operations, the ICRC need not require all
agencies to conform to all of its security principles, but there will certainly
be some inflexible rules. For instance, as lead agency, the ICRC would be
the only agency permitted to negotiate and contract with local government
authorities, belligerents, and other powerful groups in an area. The breach
of this policy by an agency could have serious repercussions for the safety
of the entire operation and therefore, should be punishable by the ICRC.
The ICRC rose to the challenge of combating emerging security
risks and has set a powerful and visible precedent to guide all agencies. Be-
cause the security principles are both effective and adaptive to a given situa-
tion, the ICRC will not only be a leader in organizational aspects of the op-
eration, but also in security matters. New and increased security risks make
it necessary for the humanitarian community to consider and respond to
these issues. Risk-aversion by agencies cannot be universally tolerated be-
cause it defeats the aim of effectiveness of providing aid to those in need.
The ICRC's already sound and workable security principles have allowed it
to maintain its legitimacy and helped it provide aid. The same legitimacy
can be imputed to the U.N. system if the ICRC is allowed to take charge in
both organizational and security matters.
CONCLUSION
The United Nations has gradually become aware of the crippling
economic effect of comprehensive sanctions on the civilian population of a
target state, much to the credit of the Iraq experience described in this Note.
After Iraq, the United Nations continued to use sanctions as a policy tool,
but favored "smart" sanctions (also known as "targeted" sanctions) as op-
posed to the comprehensive sanctions used against Iraq. Smart sanctions are
intended to lessen civilian suffering by targeting the specific government
actors who the United Nations is attempting to coerce or control." 3 Smart
sanctions are generally preferred over comprehensive sanctions, but com-
plex political situations and resistance and/or aggression by the target coun-
try may cause the Security Council to choose comprehensive sanctions over
113 See Koenraad Van Brabant, Can Sanctions be Smarter? The Current Debate 18 (1999)
available at http://www.odihpn.org/documents/sancconf.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2007) (re-
porting on a conference held in London December 16-17, 1998); see generally DANIEL W.
DREZNER, THE SANCTIONS PARADOx: ECONOMIC STATECRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (Steve Smith et al eds., 1999).
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smart sanctions to increase effectiveness.1 14 Nevertheless, the use of so-
called "smart sanctions" has yielded questionable success in U.N. imple-
mentation. l
1 5
Smart sanctions cannot completely alleviate all of the harmful con-
sequences to a civilian population. One of the biggest problems with smart
sanctions is that although they are functional at the outset, they become less
effective as the sanction regime continues. In many cases, and for various
reasons-mainly non-compliance by the targeted state-a sanctions regime
must be extended far beyond its planned duration in order to be effective,
thus creating unintended humanitarian consequences.
11 6
Neither comprehensive nor smart sanctions can shield a civilian
population from destructive humanitarian consequences. Each method of
sanctioning has shortcomings and cannot deal, in and of itself, with the
problem of unintended civilian harm. For now, it seems that U.N. sanctions
regimes cannot eradicate the disastrous effects of sanctions on the civilian
population of a target country.
Because the consequences of U.N. sanctions are unavoidable and
unpredictable, and the U.N. sanctions management and authority structure
114 See Robin Geiss, Humanitarian Safeguards in Economic Sanctions Regimes: A Call for
Automatic Suspension Clauses, Periodic Monitoring, and Follow-up Assessment of Long-
Term Effects, 18 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 167, 183-87 (2005). For example, comprehensive
sanctions may be necessary against a country like Iran. "Thus far, Iran has not responded to
threats of economic enforcement measures and appears ready to endure coercive measures
to maintain its nuclear program." Id. at 185. (emphasis added). "[T]he Security Council may
be left with few alternatives other than to use a comprehensive sanctions regime." Id. (em-
phasis added). To date, comprehensive sanctions have been imposed on Southern Rhodesia,
Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Haiti. Id. at 185-86. For descriptions of U.N. sanctions in various
countries see S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990); S.C. Res. 713, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/713 (Sept. 25, 1991); S.C. Res. 724, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/724 (Dec. 15 1991);
S.C. Res. 727, U.N. Doc. S/RES/727 (Jan. 8, 1992); S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841
(June 16, 1993); S.C. Res. 917, U.N. Doc. S/RES/917 (May 6, 1994).
115 See generally David B. Kopel et al., Is Resisting Genocide A Human Right?, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1275, 1276, 1280-1288 (2006) (examining the failures of targeted sanctions
and other measures); see also Kimberly Ann Elliot, Analyzing the Effect of Targeted Sanc-
tions, in SMART SANcIoNs: TARGETING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 171, 179 (David Cortright &
George A. Lopez eds., 2002) ("In general, the problem with trying to extend the targeted
approach to financial flows is that the more targeted the sanctions are, the easier they will be
to evade.").
116 See Geiss, supra note 114, at 185-86. A good example of the failure of smart sanctions
and exemptions is the U.N. sanctions imposed against Haiti in 1993. The first set of sanctions
was limited to a targeted embargo on fuel and arms. The sanctions contained humanitarian
relief clauses (exemptions) to allow for speedy approval of humanitarian items. However, an
unforeseen consequence of the sanctions was an increased in transportation costs, resulting in
a dramatic increase in the price of food. Additionally, the U.N. found smart sanctions inade-
quate to coerce the intended targets and was forced to adopt a comprehensive regime. See
S.C. Res. 917, supra note 114; S.C. Res. 841, supra note 114; Geiss, supra note 114, at 185-
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in the field is inadequate, the process must be altered to create a strong or-
ganizational presence in the field. Appointing the ICRC as the lead agency
of field operations in the U.N. system during humanitarian crises can ad-
dress the deficiencies of the current system, while increasing international
respect for and acceptance of the U.N. humanitarian system.

